The federal Disability Insurance (DI) program is the largest income replacement program in the United States directed toward nonelderly adults, with annual cash transfers exceeding $54 billion in 2001. Once bene ts are awarded, recipients receive income replacement and health insurance through Medicare until return to work, medical recovery, death, or retirement at age 65, at which point they obtain equivalent bene ts from the Social Security Administration's Old Age and Survivors Insurance program. Over the past two decades, two important changes have impacted eligibility and generosity for this program. The rst, occurring in 1984, liberalized the disability determination process, reversing a dramatic reduction in disability rolls underway. The second occurred more gradually. Because the DI bene ts formula is progressive and indexed to the mean wage in the economy, the widening dispersion of earnings during the 1980s and 1990s substantially raised the ratio of disability in-come to prior earnings (the "replacement rate") for low-skilled workers, a trend augmented by the rising real value of medical bene ts provided. Contemporaneously, the share of nonelderly adults receiving DI income rose by more than 60 percent from its 1984 trough to 3.7 percent of the adult population ages 25 to 64 (5.3 million bene ciaries). Relative to prior DI cohorts, new entrants were younger and substantially more likely to suffer from low mortality impairments, particularly pain and mental disorders.
The objective of this paper is to assess how these programmatic changes-reduced screening stringency and a rising replacement rate-interacted with declining demand for lessskilled workers to impact labor force participation of the low skilled during the period of 1978 to 1998. The question is intrinsically dif cult. DI is for the most part a uniformly administered federal program, making for limited treatment-control comparisons. Additionally, while aggregate health improved during the past two decades, reduced DI screening stringency coincided with a period of declining labor market opportunities for less-skilled workers, making it likely that demand for bene ts (as a form of income replacement) rose while bene ts supply was shifting outward.
1 Finally, the administrative de nition of disability-the inability to "engage in a substantial gainful activity"-ensures that holding health constant, disability bene ts are easier to obtain when job opportunities are scarcer. Given these confounds, distinguishing the impacts of increasing supply from increasing demand for bene ts is a major theme of our paper.
To (attempt to) surmount these issues, we develop two sets of instrumental variables to proxy demand and supply conditions. To identify exogenous variation in the supply of disability benets, we exploit the progressivity of the DI bene ts formula. This formula does not account for variation in regional wage levels, and hence potential replacement rates are substantially higher in low wage states. This variation yields differential cross-state bene t supply shifts during program contractions and expansions (both of which occurred in our sample frame) in high versus low replacement rate states. To identify exogenous variation in the demand for bene ts, we follow Bartik [1991] in constructing a measure of state level labor demand shifts at low and medium frequency. This measure, a weighted sum of national industry employment changes (excluding own state employment) projected onto state industry composition, performs well in predicting the ow of DI applications by state, indicating that adverse demand shocks raise demand for disability bene ts. Exploiting this combination of instruments, we study the impact of the supply and demand for DI bene ts on the labor force behavior of low-skilled workers during the period of 1978 -1998. Our contribution builds on an in uential literature exploring the impacts of disability bene ts on the level of labor force participation in the United States and abroad.
2 Distinct from this literature, our paper analyzes the impact of the supply of disability bene ts on the responses of low-skilled workers to adverse labor market shocks. The rationale for this focus is that nonemployment is a de facto precondition for disability application, making the opportunity cost of seeking DI bene ts higher for employed workers than for job losers and nonparticipants. Many potential bene ciaries will therefore seek bene ts in the event of job loss but not otherwise. We call these potential bene ciaries "conditional applicants." As our conceptual model demonstrates, the size of this conditional group is likely to be relatively elastic to program and labor market conditions. By contrast, direct employment to disability transitions will be relatively inelastic. Our framework therefore implies that reduced DI screening stringency, rising replacement rates, and slackening demand for lowskilled workers should have raised the propensity of workers facing an adverse demand shock to exit the labor force to seek disability bene ts.
This prediction structures our empirical analysis. After establishing that cross-state shifts in the supply of bene ts raised the labor force participation of less-skilled workers during the 1979 -1984 disability retrenchment and lowered them thereafter, 2. Key papers in this literature include Parsons [1980] , Bound [1989] , Haveman, De Jong, and Wolfe [1991] , Bound and Waidman [1992] , Gruber and Kubik [1997] , Aarts, Burkhauser, and De Jong [1996] , and Gruber [2000] , who study the impact of disability bene ts on labor supply in Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States. Lewin-VHI, Inc. [1995] , Rupp and Stapleton [1995] , and Stapleton et al. [1998] analyze the importance of the economic climate to disability application and receipt. Bound and Burkhauser [1999] provide a comprehensive overview of the labor market impacts of disability programs. The work closest in spirit to the approach taken here is the excellent study by Black, Daniel, and Sanders [2002] , who measure the impact of shocks to coal prices on DI and SSI income in mining intensive counties. The Black, Daniel, and Sanders study does not explore labor market implications.
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT we turn to an examination of the interaction of the disability program with adverse demand shocks. We nd that DI application rates for given demand shocks rose secularly after the disability reforms of 1984, reaching two to three times their prereform levels by the late 1990s. Paralleling this change, we estimate a 60 percent increase in the propensity of displaced high school dropouts to exit the labor force. Simple calculations suggest that increased disability application propensity can account for this behavioral change. As alternative explanations for the observed labor force exit of less-skilled workers, we explore the importance of changing mortality rates, rising immigration and incarceration rates, uctuations in UI bene ts, and, logically, falling wages. Although many of these factors appear relevant to cross-state patterns of low-skilled labor force participation, none substantially alters the nding that the increasing supply of DI bene ts induced substantial labor force exit of low-skilled workers during 1984 -1998. To gauge the importance of changes in the DI program for the aggregate labor market, we calculate the demand contraction experienced by high school dropouts over the post-disability-reform years to form a counterfactual labor force participation gure net of disability. A limitation of our approach is that it does not allow us to disaggregate the separate labor market impacts of reduced screening and rising replacement rates-the latter a partial function of declining relative wages for low-skilled workers. Summing over these structural components, our "reducedform" counterfactual suggests that the changes in labor force behavior of less-skilled workers induced by the disability system lowered the measured U. S. unemployment rate of nonelderly adults by half a percentage point since 1984. Notably, the impact of disability on the aggregate labor market is yet to be fully felt. Steady state calculations augur a further 40 percent increase in DI recipiency rates over the next decade, which is likely to be concentrated among less-skilled workers.
I. POST-1984 CHANGES TO THE FEDERAL DISABILITY SYSTEM: SCREENING, BENEFITS, AND BENEFICIARIES
The federal government provides cash and medical bene ts to the disabled through the Social Security Disability Insurance
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(DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.
3 The health eligibility criteria for the two programs are identical, requiring a medically determinable impairment that prevents the applicant from engaging in any "substantial gainful activity." SSI bene ts are means-tested and do not require prior work history. DI bene ts, which are not means tested, are set according to a recipient's prior earnings history. To obtain bene ts, applicants provide detailed medical, income, and asset information to a federal Social Security Administration (SSA) of ce, which makes the disability determination. Individuals currently in the labor force are not normally eligible for disability bene ts. 
I. A. Clampdown and Liberalization
During the late 1970s, concern over swelling disability rolls spurred the Social Security Administration to tighten medical eligibility criteria and exercise greater control over the state boards that interpret SSA's eligibility standards. The fraction of applicants awarded bene ts (the "award rate") fell from 45 percent in 1976 to 32 percent in 1980. Augmenting this administrative action, Congress passed legislation in 1980 mandating that SSA conduct more frequent bene ciary health reassessments known as Continuing Disability Reviews. In the subsequent three years, SSA determined that more than 380,000 DI bene ciaries-40 percent of those whose cases were reviewed-no longer met medical standards and terminated their bene ts [Rupp and Scott 1998 ]. Congress also required the Social Security Administration to further tighten medical criteria, accelerating the decline in award rates. This large-scale curtailment of bene ts, occurring during the deepest postwar U. S. recession, was met with intense public criticism. Citing violations of due process, seventeen states refused to comply with the DI review effort during 1983 and 1984. Responding to the backlash, Congress passed legislation in 1984 that profoundly altered the disability determination system, 3 . Approximately one-fourth of DI recipients also receive funds from Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI), which is an entitlement program rather than a labor income insurance system. Though the two programs have many overlaps, we focus on DI because by design, it has far more interaction with labor force participants. Bound, Burkhauser, and Nichols [2001] report that approximately 85 percent of DI applicants were employed 36 months prior to application while the comparable gure for SSI applicants was below 30 percent.
4. For example, earnings exceeding $500 per month in 1999 would have automatically disquali ed a DI applicant.
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT yielding a broader de nition of disability and providing applicants and medical providers with greater opportunity to in uence the decision process.
5 Despite improving economic conditions, the number of DI awards increased by one-third from its 1982 trough to a 1986 peak (the highest level reached during the 1980s). Contemporaneously, Continuing Disability Reviews came to a near halt. In the ve years from 1985 through 1989, SSA terminated fewer individuals for failing to meet medical eligibility standards than it had terminated in the rst ve months of 1982.
I. B. Rising Replacement Rates
While we have stressed the role of the liberalization of screening in expanding the supply of DI bene ts, potentially as signi cant was an unforeseen rise in the earnings replacement rate. This rise was caused by the interaction between the DI bene ts indexation schedule and the growth of earnings inequality in the United States economy.
6
Determination of an individual's DI bene t proceeds in two steps. First, the bene ciary's Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) is computed as
where Y it is equal to an individual's average monthly earnings (conditional on employment) in each year t, in ated to current 5. SSA was required to 1) relax its strict screening of mental illness by placing less weight on diagnostic and medical factors and relatively more on functional factors, such as ability to function in a work or worklike setting; 2) consider source evidence provided by the applicant's own health care provider prior to the results of SSA consultative examination; 3) give additional weight to pain and related factors; 4) consider multiple nonsevere impairments as constituting a disability during the initial determination (whereas prior to 1984, applicants were automatically denied awards during the initial determination if all impairments were judged to be nonsevere); 5) desist from terminating bene ts for any individual for whom SSA could not demonstrate substantial evidence of medical improvement; 6) provide bene ts for those former recipients whose terminations were under appeal; and 7) suspend Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) for mental impairments and pain until appropriate guidelines could be developed. In the post-1984 period, two additional administrative factors affected applications and terminations. In 1991, due to successful court challenges to SSA's treatment of source evidence, regulations were adopted placing further weight on the information provided by an SSI or DI applicant's own medical provider. Finally, agency downsizing during the 1980s and increased claims workload in the 1990s resulted in a substantial decrease in the frequency of CDRs during 1989 . See Stapleton et al. [1998 for a detailed discussion.
6. To our knowledge, this increase has been overlooked by the economics and DI policy literatures.
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dollars by the ratio of the average wage in the United States economy two year's prior (Y T22 ) to the average wage in the year of earnings. Second, the bene t awarded, the "Primary Insurance Amount" (PIA), is computed from the AIME using the piecewise linear formula,
PIA 5 H 0.9 3 AIME if AIME [ @0,b1# 0.9 3 b1 1 0.32 3~AIME 2 b1! if AIME [~b1,b2# 0.9 3 b1 1 0.32 3~b2 2 b1! 1 0.15 3~AIME 2 b2! if AIME . b2, where the "bend points" (b1, b2) are also rescaled each year by average wage growth in the economy. As visible in (2), the DI bene ts formula is progressive (i.e., concave), ensuring that lowwage workers replace a greater share of income.
8 Indexation of the bene t formula to the mean wage in the economy further ensures that bene t levels keep pace with aggregate earnings growth.
In an era of stable earnings inequality, this formula has little impact on the evolution of replacement rates. Between 1979 and 1995, however, real weekly earnings of full-time, full-year workers with less than a high school degree fell by 19.1 percentage points, while the Social Security Administration's mean wage series increased by 21.6 percentage points in real wage terms.
9
This increase in the proportional difference between mean wages and below-mean wages caused the DI replacement rate for lowwage workers to rise substantially.
To illustrate the mechanism underlying this rise, it is useful to consider a worker whose earnings growth over her career lagged contemporaneous average nominal wage growth (as would be true for many low-skilled workers in this era). Because the 7. In addition, approximately the lowest ve years of earnings are discarded and quarters with earnings in excess of that period's taxable Social Security maximum are truncated at the cap. Once the DI bene t is awarded, annual cost-of-living increases are tied to the Consumer Price Index. The two-year lag for the earnings indexation factor in equation (1) re ects the historic time lag required for calculating the numerator of this series.
8. For example, a worker with an AIME that did not exceed b1 would receive 90 percent earnings replacement. Because a 7.65 percent Social Security payroll tax is assessed on wage but not on DI income, the effective replacement rate would be closer to 100 percent.
9. Real wages are calculated from CPS March Annual Demographic les as annual earnings of full-time male high school dropouts ages 25-64 for earnings years 1979 and 1998. Wages series are de ated by the chain-weighted PCE de ator.
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT wage index applied in (1) and (2) in ates prior earnings to current dollars using the growth rate of average nominal wages, the indexed monthly earnings (AIME) computed in step 1 of the bene ts calculation for this low earnings-growth individual would exceed current earnings. Additionally, because the bend points in (2) follow the same wage index, these would also have risen relative to individual earnings. A greater share of the worker's AIME would therefore be replaced on the steeper sections of the curve (i.e., in the 90 and 32 percent ranges rather than the 15 percent range). These two impacts-a rising AIME and rising bend points-are additive: indexation of earnings to the mean wage raises the ratio of AIME to prior earnings while indexation of the bend points raises the share of the AIME replaced on the more generous sections of the bene ts formula.
The distributional impacts of indexation are seen in Table I . Currently employed male workers ages 55-61 at the tenth percentile of the (age-speci c) earnings distribution who obtained DI bene ts in 1979 would have replaced 52 percent of their current earnings with DI cash transfers. By 1999, this number had risen to 74 percent. Accounting for the rising value of in-kind Medicare bene ts, the potential DI replacement rate for a tenth percentile male age 55-61 rose still further from 67 to 104 percent. Nor was this rise limited to the older workers. For males at the tenth percentile of earnings, the rise in the replacement rate exceeded 18 percentage points in all age brackets. At higher positions in the earnings distribution, however, the growth was far less pronounced. For workers at the seventy-fth and ninetieth percentiles of earnings, potential replacement rates rose a comparatively modest 4 to 8 percentage points.
10
I. C. Changing Characteristics of DI Bene ciaries
As documented in Tables II and III , several marked demographic shifts in the DI population accompanied these bene t 10. Further information on all data sources and variable construction is provided in the Data Appendix. Note that there was also a substantial-albeit far less pronounced-rise in the DI replacement rate for relatively high wage workers due to a large increase in earnings subject to the OASDI tax. Income subject to the OASDI tax was capped at approximately 1.2 times average earnings during the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s and then rose to approximately 2.4 times average by 1989, where it currently remains. Because bene ts are only computed from taxed rather than total earnings, the increase in the cap caused replacement rates to rise for even relatively high wage workers.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS supply shifts. One was a rapid increase in the share of younger recipients. Among males ages 25-39 and 40 -54, DI receipt rose by 50 percent between 1984 and 1999. The proportional increase for males above age 54 was only one-quarter as large. Among women, growth in DI receipt was even more rapid but also skewed toward younger recipients. On net, the share of DI re- Replacement rates are calculated using the Social Security Administration Disability Insurance bene t formula for 1979 and 1999 in conjunction with annual earnings data from the March CPS les for the years 1963-1998 and the 1978 CPS Social Security Earnings Records Exact Match le for the years 1951-1962. The rst two columns represent the ratio of potential disability bene ts to current earnings for males in the labor force and with nonzero earnings in 1978 and 1998. The latter two columns add average Medicare expenditures to DI bene ts and average percentile-speci c fringe bene ts to earnings to estimate a total compensation measure of the replacement rate. To calculate Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) for an M year old Nth percentile worker in year T, we use equation (1) of the text and assume that this individual was an M 2 t year old Nth percentile worker in year T 2 t and that low earnings years (those excluded in the AIME calculation) occurred before the age of 25. Percentile ranks in this calculation are year and age speci c. We use equation (2) of the text to estimate potential DI bene ts as a function of the AIME. The nal two columns add average Medicare expenditures for DI bene ciaries in the relevant year to the DI bene t amount and scale earnings to account for average fringe bene t rates for individuals at each of the ve earnings percentiles using data from Pierce [2001] . See the Data Appendix for further details.
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cipients between the ages of 40 and 54 rose by more than 50 percent following the 1984 liberalization while the share of male bene ciaries declined by 15 percent [U. S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement, various years] .
The DI population has always been substantially less educated than average, and as the program grew post-1984, it encompassed a substantially larger share of this population. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), we estimate that the share of high school dropouts receiv- 
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ing disability bene ts rose by over 60 percent after 1984, and more than doubled for high school dropout males ages 40 -54.
11 In 1999, a 40 -54 year old high school dropout was four to ve times as likely to receive DI bene ts as a male in the same age range with at least a high school degree.
The rapid growth in DI receipt among male high school dropouts mirrored a substantial decline in their labor force participation (panel C). Between 1984 and 1999 the labor force participation rate of high school dropout males declined by 8.7 percentage points among those 40 -54, and 7 percentage points among those 55-64. Simultaneously, the share of male high school dropouts in these age brackets receiving DI rose by 5.3 and 6.3 percentage points. Hence, despite the steep decline in male high school dropout participation, the share of male high school dropout nonparticipants receiving DI bene ts in these age categories rose to slightly above 40 percent.
12
Finally, as younger bene ciaries entered the DI rolls, the fraction suffering from comparatively low mortality impairments 11. Since SSA does not report the educational distribution of DI recipients, we use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to estimate these numbers for 1984 and 1999. SIPP data are unfortunately not available for earlier years. Relative to high school dropouts, proportionate growth in DI receipt for those with at least a high school degree was substantially smaller among males and slightly larger among females. In all cases, growth among better educated workers was from a low base.
12. Unemployment per population rates of high school dropouts also fell steeply during these years (panel D). We discuss these trends further in Section V. Annual Statistical Supplement, 1984 , 1989 , 1994 . Four-year mortality rate is from administrative follow-up of those awarded bene ts in 1985 [Hennessey and Dykacz 1993] .
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT grew (Table III) . The share of DI awardees with a primary diagnosis of a mental disorder or a disease of the musculo-skeletal system (typically back pain)-the two disorders with the lowest mortality among SSA's fourteen major diagnostic categoriesincreased by 60 percent between 1983 and 1999. The corresponding award shares for neoplasms (cancers) and circulatory system diseases (primarily heart disease), both of which have mortality far in excess of average, declined by 40 percent.
Several consequences of these demographic shifts are seen in Figure I , which plots the annual rate of DI bene t termination by cause from 1978 -2000: death, retirement, and medical disqualication. Following the 1984 liberalization, DI rolls increased at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent (excluding dependents of DI recipients). As younger cohorts with lower mortality impairments entered, the annual mortality rate of DI recipients fell by 35 percent, and the exit rate into the retirement system declined by 40 percent. Accordingly, the expected bene t duration of newer 
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cohorts substantially exceeds 1984 levels [Rupp and Scott 1998 ].
13
Because most objective evidence suggests that the prevalence of disabling illness fell during this time [Cutler and Richardson 1997] , it is likely that the growth in DI rolls is primarily explained by nonhealth factors that shifted the supply and demand for disability bene ts. These include a more expansive de nition of disability, changes in the DI award process, rising replacement rates and, closely related, declining labor market opportunities for less skilled workers.
II. WHEN DO SHIFTS IN BENEFITS SUPPLY IMPACT LABOR SUPPLY: DEMAND SHOCKS OR DIRECT QUITS?
Before analyzing the impact of changing DI bene ts supply and demand on the labor market, we offer a brief model to motivate our empirical approach. In a market setting where all job separations were involuntary, workers would apply for DI bene ts only at the onset of illness or job loss. An analysis of the impact of shifts in the supply of bene ts on labor force participation would therefore focus on the labor supply decisions of displaced workers, speci cally whether they chose to seek new employment or apply for DI bene ts instead. Since in reality workers can endogenously quit jobs to obtain DI bene ts, shifts in bene ts supply might instead largely impact labor supply by inducing endogenous quits even absent adverse shocks. Below, we write a simple dynamic programming model to explore how elastic these 13. An exception to this expansionary trend was Congress' 1996 discontinuation of bene ts for individuals who quali ed for disability on the basis of alcohol and drug addiction, resulting in the termination of approximately 130,000 beneciaries, visible in Figure I . It is estimated that approximately two-thirds of those terminated eventually requali ed for bene ts under a different impairment (cf. Lewin Group [1998] ).
14. This set of facts does not imply that more recent disability bene ciaries are "shirking." As Bound and Waidmann stress [1992, 2000] , disability is a continuous rather than a dichotomous medical state. A more expansive de nition of disability will accommodate a greater range of illness. Bound and Waidmann [2000] provide evidence that the incidence of self-reported disability among males responds markedly to changes in the generosity of the disability program. Similarly, Baker, Stabile, and Deri [2001] nd using matched medical records and health self-reports from Canada that individuals who are out of the labor force are more likely to report major medical ailments that are not re ected in objective health records. Notably, despite large increases in disability receipt, Burkhauser, Daly, Houtenville, and Nargis [2001] nd that prevalence of self-reported disability by income decile has changed little over the past two decades.
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT responses-exit after shocks or direct quits-are likely to be to shifts in the supply of bene ts.
We compare steady states of a discrete time Markov model in which individuals may be in one of three states in each period: employed; unemployed and seeking work; and seeking or receiving DI bene ts (not participating). Employed workers receive per-period utility of employment v (w,h) , where the utility of work is increasing in wages and health: v w [, v h [ . 0. 15 Employed workers face a per-period hazard s of job loss and unemployed job seekers face a per-period hazard q of reemployment. As an alternative to employment, individuals may seek DI bene ts. Applicants with health h qualify for bene ts after one period with probability p 5 p(h), and rejected applicants may reapply. Consistent with DI program rules, labor force participants are rejected with probability one. 16 Accepted applicants receive per-period income of d in perpetuity.
We assume a discount factor of b , 1 and set per-period utility of unemployment to zero.
17 To (further) simplify the analysis, we restrict attention to the case in which neither w nor h is time varying, and we consider a set of individuals who face a common probability of DI award conditional on application:
Using these parameters, the asset value of employment reduces (after some algebra) to the following expression:
Each of the three terms inside of the brackets in (3) corresponds to one of three decision rules ("policies") that a worker may 15. In modeling the disability application decision as a function of both health and the disutility of work, we follow the approach of Diamond and Sheshinski [1995] . See also Hausman and Halpern [1986] , Burkhauser, Butler, and Weathers [1999] , Kreider [1999] , and Benitez-Silva et al. [2000] for theoretical and empirical models of the DI application decision. 16. Although it is possible that some DI applicants collect unemployment insurance bene ts during the application process, this is technically illegal and likely rare since UI bene ciaries must demonstrate that they are active job seekers. UI recipients may of course seek DI bene ts when UI is exhausted.
17. Setting per-period unemployment utility to zero is an assumption rather than a normalization. Provided that the ow utility of unemployment is less than the ow utility of receiving DI bene ts, explicitly parameterizing the level of unemployment bene ts adds complexity but does not change the core results.
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pursue: apply for DI bene ts immediately (I), apply conditional on job loss (C), or remain in the labor market after job loss (R).
The rst bracketed term in (3) is the value of quitting employment directly to seek disability bene ts. Note that if a worker selects this policy, she will nd it optimal to quit employment immediately, to reapply for bene ts if rejected, and to remain a bene ciary in perpetuity once accepted. The asset value of policy V I is therefore the present discounted value of permanent benets receipt V D 5 u(d)/(1 2 b) discounted by the expected time from quit to award, where u(d) is the per period utility of receiving DI bene ts.
The second term is the value of remaining employed until exogenous job loss and then seeking disability bene ts thereafter. We refer to this policy as "conditional application" and its value V C incorporates the asset value of applying for and ultimately receiving DI bene ts and the expected ow value of employment prior to DI application.
The third policy in brackets is the value of remaining in the labor market in perpetuity, V R . Because workers pursuing this policy seek reemployment (not DI bene ts) after job loss, the reemployment hazard q appears in this expression while the bene ts award hazard p does not.
The three components of (3) are linked by the max[ z ] operator because the value of employment for a given individual corresponds to the policy {I,C,R} that yields the highest expected utility. For market participants arrayed along the distribution of v, the value of employment is the upper envelope of these three policies. Figure II depicts a simulation of the asset value of each policy as a function of v. 18 As is visible in the gure, these three slopes give rise to two thresholds labeled ṽ IC and ṽ CR , in which the optimal policy shifts from (I) to (C) to (R) as a function of v. Solving for these thresholds yields (4)
Equation (4) 
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(the "supply" of bene ts) and labor market parameters q and s (the "demand" for bene ts) affect the share of workers pursuing each policy, in particular quitting work immediately to apply for bene ts versus applying for bene ts conditional on job loss?
Consider rst the impact of demand conditions on labor force exit. An individual who is indifferent between immediate and conditional disability application is by de nition indifferent to a change in the job loss hazard that hastens or retards the moment of application. Hence, ṽ IC is independent of s. Because workers pursuing (I) and (C) do not reenter the labor market after exit, ṽ IC is also independent of the reemployment hazard q. Consequently, changes in labor market conditions do not impact the size of the group that quits employment immediately to seek bene ts (I). These parameters do, however, unambiguously impact the size of the conditional applicant group. Because higher s and lower q reduce the value of job search, more adverse labor market conditions increase the share of workers applying for bene ts in the event of job loss, policy (C).
19
Next, consider an increase in the supply of bene ts. Logically, increases in d and p shift both ṽ IC and ṽ CR rightward, raising the total share of workers who eventually seek bene ts, both immediately and after job loss. The magnitude of the impact at the two thresholds differs, however:
Increases in d and p-and the interaction of the two-shift the conditional/remain-in-labor-force locus, ṽ CR , farther rightward than the immediate/conditional locus, ṽ IC . Provided that the density of v is weakly increasing between the previous ṽ IC locus and the new ṽ CR locus (as would be the case if the distribution of v were uniform), the size of the conditional applicant group will rise relative to the size of the immediate applicant group. Finally, it is straightforward to show using the cross-partial derivatives of ṽ IC and ṽ CR that an increase in the supply of bene ts interacts positively with adverse labor market conditions to increase the relative size of the conditional applicant group. The more generous are program bene ts or the less stringent is program screening, the more that adverse labor market conditions increase the size of the conditional group (and vice versa).
20
On net, we nd that "conditional" application is likely to be 19. It bears emphasis that this result-that direct quits are not in uenced by labor market conditions-arises in part from our assumption that w is xed; workers keep their current wage until job loss. While this assumption is clearly too strong, it is qualitatively consistent with well-known evidence that wages of incumbent workers are substantially more sheltered from labor market conditions than those of job seekers (cf. Beaudry and DiNardo [1991] , Card and Hyslop [1997] , and Kahn [1997] ). We therefore expect the direct impact of s and q on w among employed workers to be second order. By contrast, it is quite likely that the expectation of w for job losers falls substantially at job displacement due to the destruction of speci c capital or other incumbency related rents [Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993] . Broadening the model to permit expectations of w to depend on labor market conditions and the worker's employment/unemployment state would likely increase the differential attractiveness of disability application for job losers relative to employed. p]q are strictly negative. All four corresponding cross-partial derivatives for the immediate/conditional threshold ṽ IC are zero. Note that after suf cient time elapses, all "conditional applicants" exit the labor force, at which point the program exerts no further effect on their labor force participation. It is therefore appropriate to think of the model as applying to a single cohort of workers, with new cohorts entering the market in each period.
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT elastic to three forces: bene ts supply, bene ts demand, and the interaction of the two. By contrast, direct quits are only elastic to the rst of these three forces and, in general, less elastic than is conditional application. 21 Our model therefore suggests that less stringent DI screening and higher replacement rates coupled with declining labor market prospects for the low skilled are likely to have increased the propensity of job losers to exit the labor force to seek disability bene ts.
We explore two implications of the model below. In Section III we use the prediction from (5) that shifts in DI screening stringency should induce larger application responses where replacement rates are higher to test whether DI application rates and labor force participation among low skilled were differentially affected by the pre-and post-1984 shifts in DI screening in high versus low replacement rate states. In Section IV we explore the model's main implication: the responsiveness of DI application and labor force exit to adverse demand shocks should have risen secularly post DI liberalization.
III. DISABILITY BENEFITS AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: INSTRUMENTING FOR BENEFITS SUPPLY
We begin the empirical analysis by exploiting the disability retrenchment of 1979 -1984 and subsequent liberalization of 1984 -1998 to study the impact of shifts in the supply of disability bene ts on labor force participation. A comparison of the two periods provides a useful contrast: per-capita DI receipt among nonelderly adults contracted at 0.10 percentage points annually during 1979 -1984 and then expanded at 0.07 percentage points per year during the subsequent fourteen years. If the supply of disability bene ts impacts labor supply, it should have had opposite impacts on labor force participation during these two time periods.
Suppressing subscripts, we write the conditional expectation of labor force participation as
. A disadvantage of our focus on steady states is that we do not model the labor market impacts of unanticipated changes in parameter values that may induce immediate labor force exits that would not be visible in equilibrium. Consequently, our model should not be taken to imply that the impact of DI bene ts on direct quits is negligible, only that the response of "conditional" applications is likely to be more elastic than direct exits.
where LFP is a dichotomous variable equal to one if an individual is a labor force participant, w is the opportunity wage, h is health, and X is a vector of individual characteristics. We denote the DI bene ts "supply" faced by the potential labor force participant as g (d,p) , assumed to be increasing in both the replacement rate d and the odds of obtaining bene ts conditional on application p. The coef cient of interest in (6) is f, the impact of potential bene ts on labor force participation.
There are a number of dif culties in estimating this equation with individual level data: we cannot typically observe both d and w for a given individual; objective measures of h are normally not available from survey data; and, as stressed by Bound [1989] , because individuals with poor health typically experience declining wages and hence rising potential DI replacement rates, omission of h from (6) will bias estimates of f.
22
To surmount some of these biases, we estimate a state-level analog of (6) in rst differences:
where j subscripts the 50 U. S. states excluding the District of Columbia and D t denotes the rst difference operator over years t and t. As a proxy for changes in the supply of disability bene ts, we initially use the observed contemporaneous state-level changes in DI recipients per 1000 nonelderly population ages 25-64 (DDI jt ). We subsequently instrument this measure. Since SSA does not report the educational attainment of DI bene ciaries, we use the total count of nonelderly recipients by state. OLS estimates of (7) are given in the rst four columns of Table IV . Here, the dependent variable is the state-level annualized percentage point change in the labor force participation rate of the relevant demographic subgroup calculated from the merged monthly les of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1978 to 1998.
23
Column 1 of Table IV indicates that states with more rapid
22. An additional dif culty is the possibility of unmeasured compositional shifts in the high school dropout population, which declined from 26 to 12 percent of overall population during 1979-1998. To (imperfectly) account for composition, we control for high school dropout age structure in each state in all models.
23. Models also control for the age distribution of the relevant demographic subgroups. We initially assume that, conditional on age and education, average wage and health changes are common across states and hence allow them to be absorbed by a. In Section VI we directly examine these (and other) alternative explanatory variables. A key assumption here is that health is not itself procyclical. Ruhm [2000] provides evidence that health is countercyclical. 24 Column 2 displays the analogous estimate for the labor force participation of high school dropout males during the postliberalization era from 1984 -1998. Although the variation in column 1 is driven by DI program contraction while variation in column 2 stems from program expansion, the estimated impact of DI bene ts on labor force participation is near identical in each period.
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Subsequent columns tabulate the relationship between DI receipt and labor force participation of males with at least a high school education. The point estimates are always small and typically insigni cant. Although DI receipt increased among better educated adults after 1984 (Table II) , this growth does not appear to have been accompanied by labor force exit.
25
These OLS estimates will be biased if shifts in the supply of bene ts due to program retrenchment and reform are correlated with state-level shifts in the demand for bene ts (due, for example, to earnings and health shocks). To isolate the component of variation in DI rolls that is due to bene ts supply, we exploit the progressivity of the DI bene ts formula. This formula does not account for variation in regional wage levels and thus gives rise to substantial cross-state variation in potential replacement rates. As indicated by equation (5) of our model, shifts in screening stringency are predicted to have a greater impact on DI rolls where the level of the replacement rate is higher. Hence, the interaction between national shifts in the DI screening regime 24. Since high school dropouts comprise a far larger share of the disability recipient population than their share in the workforce, this coef cient is of reasonable magnitude: male high school dropouts averaged 7.9 percent of the labor force over 1984 and comprised 25 percent of all disability recipients in 1999 (SIPP data).
25. Estimates found in Table 3 of the NBER Working Paper version of this paper [Autor and Duggan 2001] indicate that state-level changes in SSI receipt are unrelated to the labor force participation of high school dropouts (or those with higher education), in contrast to the results above for DI receipt. This pattern is consistent with the differing labor force histories of the bene ciaries of these two programs (see footnote 3).
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT and state replacement rates may serve as an instrument for the state-level shifts in the supply of DI bene ts.
26
Columns 5-8 of Table IV implement this instrumental variables approach. Using Social Security earnings records from the March 1978 CPS Exact Match le, we calculate that the median potential DI earnings replacement rate of currently employed males in 1978 ranged from a low of 18 percent in Alaska to a high of 38 percent in South Carolina, with a cross-state standard deviation of 2.6 percentage points. The rst-stage coef cients tabulated at the bottom of columns 5-8 con rm that per-capita changes in DI rolls were substantially more negative in high replacement-rate states during 1978 -1984 and, conversely, were substantially more positive in 1984 -1998. 27 The corresponding instrumental variables estimates of the impact of the supply of DI bene ts on labor force participation by education group strongly corroborate the earlier OLS estimates. Inward shifts in the supply of DI bene ts raised the labor force participation of low-skilled males and females during 1978 -1984; outward supply shifts reduced them thereafter. IV estimates again show no impact of DI bene ts on the labor force participation of more-skilled workers.
Since the growth in DI rolls was proportionately larger among females than males during 1984 to 1998, panel B of Table  IV repeats these estimates for female labor force participation. As in panel A, we nd that the supply of DI bene ts reduces the labor force participation of high school dropout females and not those with higher education both during the retrenchment and reform periods. These results are especially striking in light of the fact that female labor force participation rose at all education levels over 1984 -1998 (Table II) . 26 . Provided of course that these interactions are not perversely correlated with state-level health and income shocks in both retrenchment and reform periods. This possibility seems particularly unlikely because the supply shifts are of opposite sign for each state in the retrenchment and reform eras. We provide further evidence on this point in Section VI.
27. The instrumental variable employed is the earnings replacement rate at the seventy-fth percentile of the male potential DI replacement rate distribution calculated from the CPS-SSER. We use the earnings of males exclusively because of their high rate of labor force attachment, and use the seventy-fth percentile replacement rate-typically corresponding to low earnings workers-because of our focus on labor supply of low skilled. Using the median replacement instead does not qualitatively impact our results. The interpretation of the rst-stage coef cient in column 5 of panel A of the table is that for each additional percentage point of replacement rate in 1978, state disability rolls fell by 0.077 recipients per 1000 nonelderly adults per year during 1978-1984. 178
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IV. DO DISABILITY BENEFITS AFFECT HOW LOW-SKILLED WORKERS RESPOND TO ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT SHOCKS?
The nding that shifts in DI bene ts impact labor supply is consistent with two (not mutually exclusive) explanations: a onceand-for-all labor supply response, corresponding to an increase in direct quits in our model; or a secular shift in the sensitivity of labor force exit to adverse demand shocks, corresponding to an increase in "conditional exits." Our model predicts that the latter mechanism should have become increasingly signi cant following DI reform: reduced screening stringency, rising replacement rates, and declining demand for low-skilled workers should each have raised the relative attractiveness of DI application and labor force exit for workers facing adverse shocks.
To test this implication, we require a measure of plausibly exogenous labor demand shocks. Following the approach developed by Bartik [1991] and employed by Blanchard and Katz [1992] and Bound and Holzer [2000] , we exploit cross-state differences in industrial composition and national-level changes in employment to predict individual state employment growth. Speci cally, we calculate the predicted log employment change ĥ jt for each state j between years t and t as (8)
where h -j kt is the log change in two-digit industry k's employment share nationally and g jkt is the share of state employment in industry k in state j in the initial year. The subscript -j in h -j kt indicates that each state's industry k employment is excluded in calculating the national employment share change.
28
This methodology predicts what each state's change in employment would be if industry level employment changes occurred uniformly across states and state-level industrial composition was xed in the short term. States that had a relatively large share of workers in declining industries will have predicted employment declines, while states that differentially employed 28. In excluding own-state employment, our projected employment changes differ from the authors cited earlier. We found that including own-state employment substantially increased the predictive power of the employment projections, which raised a concern about a potential mechanical relationship. Also distinct from Bound and Holzer [2000] , we compute h -j kt as the change in log industry employment shares rather than levels. This makes the demand index strictly a relative measure.
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT workers in growing industries will have predicted increases. Provided that national industry growth rates (excluding own state industry employment) are uncorrelated with state-level labor supply shocks, this approach will identify plausibly exogenous variation in state employment.
IV. A. Estimation Framework
We consider a modi ed form of equation (6) in which we write the conditional expectation of DI application for a displaced worker as (9) E@ApplyuJob Loss,X,w,d,p,h#
where g[ again represents the disability supply function. Our model implies that s . 0, greater bene ts supply increases the propensity of adversely shocked workers to exit the labor force. As above, we estimate this equation using state-level data. Here, the move from individual to aggregate data is less straightforward. Ignoring demographic characteristics in (9) for the moment, we write the model for the ow of state DI applications in year t through t as (10)~Apps/Pop! jt 5 a 1 l t D~Emp/Pop! jt 1 e jt , where l t measures the direct impact of employment losses on DI application ows in year t. Similarly, we model labor force exit as
In this equation declines in labor force participation come from two sources: workers who withdraw from the labor force but do not seek DI bene ts (measured by u t ); and job losers who leave the labor force to seek DI bene ts (l t ). As the equation underscores, our data do not permit a direct estimate of s in (9). Instead, estimates of (11) will yield a reduced form that combines both sources of labor force exit:
(12) D~NILF/Pop! jt 5 a 0 1 p t D~Emp/Pop! jt 1 y t , where p t 5 l t 1 u t .
Given this constraint, we estimate equations (10) and (12) separately in both the pre-and post-DI liberalization eras to 180 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS obtain estimates of Dl t and Dp t , the change in the responsiveness of DI applications and labor force exit to demand shocks of given magnitude. With these estimates, we may distinguish three cases. First, if DI application sensitivity has risen but labor force exit propensity has not (Dl t . 0 and Dp t ' 0), this would suggest that rising DI bene ts supply has increased program take-up but not impacted labor force exit. Conversely, if Dl t ' 0 and Dp t . 0, this would indicate that labor force exit has risen for given shocks but that this change is unrelated to the supply of DI bene ts. Finally, if Dl t ' Dp t . 0, application and labor force exit propensity have risen conformably, we will view this as evidence that the rising supply of DI bene ts has increased the propensity of adversely shocked workers to withdraw from the labor force to apply for DI bene ts. A limitation of this approach is that it does not separately identify the impacts of rising replacement rates and declining screening stringency on labor force exit propensity. The effect that we identify will be a sum of these structural components.
IV. B. Estimation: Adverse Employment Shocks and DI Application Flows
Estimates of equation (10), the impact of employment shocks on DI application ows, are given in Table V . The dependent variable in this table is the annualized state level ow of unique DI applications per capita during 1978 -1984 and 1984 -1998 . The independent variable is the annualized projected state log employment shock measure ĥ jt for the corresponding time interval. Models also include time dummies and control for changes in the age and gender distribution of nonelderly adult state residents. As above, we initially make the assumption that wage and health variables are uncorrelated with employment shocks but examine their impact directly in Section VI.
Column (1) of Table V provides an estimate of equation (10) for the pre-DI liberalization period of 1978 -1984. The point estimate of 20.13 indicates that a 1-percent projected log state employment contraction yielded 1.3 additional DI applications per 1000 nonelderly adults over these ve years. The subsequent column pools data for the entire time period, adding an interaction between the shock measure, ĥ jt , and a post-1984 dummy variable. The coef cient on the interaction term implies that the impact of adverse shocks on DI application ows grew threefold from the retrenchment to the reform era. Adding state dummies 
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to control for xed state differences in DI application ows only slightly reduces the magnitude of the estimated growth, which remains highly signi cant. To potentially improve upon the precision of these estimates, we reestimate these models using stacked data on application ows and projected demand shocks by state at three-year intervals. These models found in the subsequent three columns provide qualitatively similar results. The estimated growth in DI application sensitivity is not as sizable in the stacked models, but remains quite large and signi cant. 29 To illustrate the source of this result, Figure III plots the conditional relationship between estimated log demand shocks (multiplied by 10 3 ) and DI applications per 1000 population for four ve-year subperiods of our sample. Consistent with the contemporaneous rise in replacement rates and the decline in screening stringency post 1984, the slope of the demand shock-DI application locus increases secularly in each adjacent panel. By 1993-1998 we estimate that this slope has increased sevenfold.
We have performed numerous robustness tests to verify these relationships. If the disability application variable is replaced with the ow of DI awards or the change in DI recipients per population, we nd qualitatively similar patterns [Autor and Duggan 2001] . We have also utilized county level DI receipt data to explore the sensitivity of disability rolls over 1984 -1998 to within-state variation in local demand shocks generated by variation in county-level industrial structure. Our estimates con rm that within states, counties experiencing relatively negative predicted employment shocks saw substantially faster growth in DI rolls over 1984 -1998. Panel B of Table V presents a variant of the models above in which we estimate the impact of changes in the overall high school dropout employment to population ratio on DI application ows while instrumenting high school dropout employment with the projected demand shock measure. Because these models only allow demand shocks to impact DI applications through their covariance with the high school dropout employment to popula-29. The stacked estimates are not strictly preferable since they may accentuate the importance of measurement error in the demand instrument at short intervals, particularly in models with state xed effects. To implement these estimates, we use changes for 1978-1981 and 1981-1984 for the 1978-1984 period. For the 1984 -1998 estimates, we use changes for 1984-1987, 1987-1990, 1990 -1993, 1993-1996 , and (due to sample truncation) 1995-1998. 
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FIGURE III
Impact of Projected Log Employment Shocks on Disability Applications per
1000 Nonelderly Adults at Five-Year Intervals, 1979 184
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tion ratio, it is notable that IV estimated impacts of demand shocks on DI applications are closely comparable to the stacked OLS models in panel A. High school dropout employment levels and DI application ows appear to respond to the same component of the demand shock measure.
30
IV. C. Estimation: Adverse Employment Shocks and Labor Force Exit of High School Dropouts
Since essentially all disability applicants are labor force nonparticipants, the nding of rising DI application sensitivity for given shocks has two potential explanations. One is that since 1984, employment shocks have increasingly spurred labor force nonparticipants to apply for disability bene ts, perhaps in anticipation of dif culty nding work at labor market reentry. A second is that the share of job losers exiting the labor force to seek disability bene ts has risen. In terms of equation (12), these cases correspond to Dp t ' 0 versus Dp t . 0.
We distinguish these possibilities by estimating (12) using projected demand shocks to instrument for net employment losses at the state level. Using the identity that D(Emp/Pop) jt 5 2D(Unemp/Pop) jt 2 D(NILF/Pop) jt , we can decompose the impact of employment shocks into the component accruing to unemployment and the component accruing to labor force exit. To facilitate comparison to the DI application regressions, we present results for both male and female high school dropouts combined and disaggregated estimates by gender. These are found in Table VI. During 1978 -1984 a one-percentage-point shock to the employment to population ratio of high school dropouts induced a 0.46 percentage point increase in nonparticipation per population and, by implication, a 0.54 percentage point increase in unemployment per population. In the succeeding fourteen years, shocks to employment of equal magnitude led to substantially larger declines in labor force participation. In both 1984 -1990 and 1990 -1998 , we nd that essentially all declines in high 30. Because the rst stage of the long change models in columns (1)- (4) is weak, we focus discussion on the stacked models. A signi cant limitation of these models is that our DI application measure is not disaggregated by education level, and hence it is unlikely that the data satisfy the implied exclusion restriction that demand shocks impact DI applications only through high school dropout employment changes.
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT school dropout employment led to increases in nonemployment rather than unemployment.
To control for persistent state trends in labor force exit that would bias the results if correlated with the demand shock measure, we add state xed effects to models in columns (2), (6), and (8). Their addition has little impact on the pattern of estimates. To further explore robustness, columns (7) and (8) pool data for 1978 -1998, adding an interaction between the employment loss measure and a post-1984 dummy variable. The pooled estimates con rm a signi cant increase in the labor force exit propensity of 1978-1984 1984-1990 1990-1998 1984-1998 1978-1998 (1) 1978-1984 1984-1998 1978-1998 1978-1998 (1) Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering of state level observations in models excluding state dummies. All data points are stacked three-year state level changes in the relevant measure for years 78 -81, 81-84, 84 -87, 87-90, 90-93, 93-96, and 95-98 . Models also include year dummies and control for changes in the age distribution of state high school dropout population (ages 25-39 and 40 -54, with 55-64 omitted) for the relevant gender group. Estimates are weighted by state share of U. S. population in each year. Instrumental variable used for change in employment to population ratio of high school dropouts in all models is projected state level log employment shock for relevant time interval and, in pooled 1978 -1998 speci cations, its interaction with a post-1984 dummy. See equation (8) in the text for further details on projected employment shock measure.
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displaced high school dropouts after 1984, on the order of 35 percent. Inclusion of state xed effects raises the standard errors slightly, but does not alter the ndings. As shown in panel B, the pattern of results is essentially identical for both genders.
It bears emphasis that these estimates do not imply that commencing in 1984, all-or even most-high school dropouts who lost jobs exited the labor force. Since our demand shock captures net rather than gross employment declines over comparatively long three-year intervals, displaced high school dropouts who obtain reemployment within the measurement window are not detected. In addition, the shock measure does not impact the labor market exclusively through job loss. Adverse shocks will induce some subset of workers to choose to exit employment and, perhaps more importantly, slow the prevailing rate of reentry of nonparticipants into the labor force. Similarly, some share of those exiting may be previously unemployed workers whose reemployment prospects were harmed by entry of new unemployed. Each of these forces will reduce the employment to population ratio and yield corresponding increases in nonparticipation. What is unambiguous from Table VI is that unemployment rates of low-skilled workers have become signi cantly less sensitive to adverse demand shocks while their rate of labor force nonparticipation has become substantially more so.
Could the increased generosity of the DI program plausibly account for this behavioral change? To make this calculation, note that Dl t in Table V measures the impact of employment shocks on DI applications for the entire nonelderly population, while Dp t in Table VI is measured only for high school dropouts. To make the magnitudes commensurate, we calculate
where d is the high school dropout share of population in the years of estimation, equal to 16 percentage points in our sample, and j is the share of the total ow of DI applications submitted by high school dropouts, which we estimate to be 47 percent. 31 Our estimate of Dl t from Table V ranges from 0.05 to 0.17, i.e., the fraction of all nonelderly adults applying for DI bene ts in response to a one log 31. The rate of DI receipt among high school dropouts averaged 4.6 times that of those with at least a high school degree during 1984 -1999 (Table II) . Assuming that this ratio carried over to applications, high school dropouts would have accounted for 47 percent of all DI applications received in this period.
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DISABILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT point adverse demand shock rose by 0.5 to 1.7 applicants per 1000 adults post liberalization. In this equation, 1/d rescales the estimated increase in DI applications per population to an increase per high school dropout population, while the parameter j adjusts this estimate downward to account for the fact that only part of the growth in DI applications is due to high school dropouts.
Substituting into (13), we obtain that the implied increase in high school dropout labor force exit propensity for a one log point employment contraction, Dl t D , ranges from 0.15 to 0.50. That is, if the increase in high school dropout application propensity were entirely accounted for by labor force leavers, the estimated increase in application sensitivity implies a 15 to 50 percentage point increase in their conditional probability of labor force exit. This estimate is in close accord with the ndings in Table VI . Speci cally, columns (7) and (8) [ [0.15,0 .50] from (13) fall symmetrically at one-standard error above and below this estimate. Based upon this (necessarily) rough calculation, we conclude that Dl t ' Dp t : the increasing supply of DI bene ts post-1984 can plausibly account for both greater DI application ows for given shocks and greater propensity of adversely shocked low-skilled workers to exit the labor force. Future analyses using micro-data on the employment and DI application behavior of low-skilled, displaced, and discouraged workers should be able to improve on the precision of this estimate.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AGGREGATE LABOR MARKET
The reduced sensitivity of high school dropout unemployment to adverse labor demand shocks implies that the share of high school dropouts unemployed at present is lower than it would have been if the supply of DI bene ts had not shifted outward after 1984. Consider that the typical nonelderly (that is, age Given that the overall unemployment rate of nonelderly adults in this year was 3.4 percent, this appears a sizable deviation from the conventional metric.
Although we have focused on the 1984 -1998 period, it would be inaccurate to conclude that the labor market impact of the DI program had culminated by 1998. As is shown in Figure IV , though per-capita DI awards peaked in 1992 and declined after 1995 (that is, until the 2000 recession), the rate of DI receipt grew steadily throughout the late 1990s. These facts-rising recipients despite declining awards-indicate that the DI recipient population was below steady state size. Due to post-1984 declines in DI bene ciary mortality and retirement rates (Figure I ), the expected duration of DI receipt for new entrants considerably exceeded that of previous cohorts, implying an increase in steady state program population.
To make a simple projection of this long-run size, we use the fact that in steady state, bene t terminations must equal bene t awards. Hence, P*l 5 A, where P* is the steady state population, l is the termination rate, and A is the number 32. Because the unemployment rate is denominated by labor force and not by population, the estimated impact using the overall nonelderly adult (ages 25-64) participation rate of 80.3 percent is (2.90 3 0.121)/0.803 5 0.44.
33. By using average termination rates, the calculation does not adjust for the fact that more recent DI entrants are likely to have lower mortality and retirement rates than incumbent recipients. Accounting for these cohort effects would likely raise the steady state projection considerably. The projected steady state series in Figure VII is imputed in 1997 using the average of 1996 and 1998 to discount the one-time termination of bene ciaries whose impairment was Drug and Alcohol Addiction (see Figure I and Our conclusions above must be tempered to the extent that post-1984 increases in the DI application and labor force exit propensities of low-skilled workers are explained by factors other than shifts in the supply of DI bene ts. Plausible alternative explanations for the cross-state patterns of labor force decline that are the focus of our study include real wage declines, differential health trends, rising immigration and incarceration rates, and shifts in state Unemployment Insurance (UI) bene ts. We explore each of these alternatives below. Means and cross-state standard deviations of these measures are given in the rst column of Table VII. We begin with wages. As argued by Juhn [1992] and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel [1991] , a sizable elasticity of labor force participation coupled with declining real wages could explain the substantial decline in labor force participation of low skilled males in the 1980s and 1990s. To be clear, we view falling wages as a complement rather than a substitute for the role of the DI program in reducing labor force participation. Indeed, an important component of the rise in replacement rates for low-skilled workers is the interaction between declining wages and the indexation and progressivity of the DI bene ts formula. For declining real wages to be the primary explanation for our ndings, however, it would have to be the case that, not implausibly, wages fell by substantially more in states that had larger declines in labor force participation.
To explore this hypothesis, we use CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group earnings data for 1984 and 1998 to construct two measures of the change in the opportunity wage faced by lowskilled workers in each state: the change in the real xedweighted median log wage of high school dropout males ages 25-64 and the change in the real xed-weighted log wage of prime age males 25-54 at the twenty-fth percentile. 34 Because the declining wage hypothesis implies that workers with the lowest potential earnings are least likely to work, we follow 34. In an effort to maximize the explanatory power of alternative hypotheses, we chose the more inclusive measure of wages for male high school dropouts (i.e., ages 25-64 rather than 25-54). Empirically, the wage measure for the younger group of high school dropouts works similarly but has less predictive power in labor force participation regressions. Chandra [2002] in including nonparticipants in the quantile calculations, thus assuming that the potential earnings of nonparticipants fall below the median (or twenty-fth) percentile of the conditional state wage distribution. Median potential wages of male high school dropouts declined 18.6 log points between 1984 and 1998. In the same period there was a modest rise at the twenty-fth percentile for prime age male workers, re ecting strong earnings growth in the late 1990s [Katz and Krueger 1999] . Although aggregate health improved during the two decades of our sample, differential cross-state health trends could be in part responsible for our ndings. To test this possibility, we exploit an objective health measure: the mortality rate (excluding accidental deaths and homicides) among state residents ages 25-64. 35 We control for both levels and changes of this measure since each should impact the response of state DI rolls to a reduction in DI screening stringency. Mortality rates declined by one-quarter between 1984 and 1998.
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A third potential confound is immigration. Because lesseducated immigrants typically have greater labor force attachment than native-born high school dropouts [Trejo 2001] and are not eligible for disability bene ts until ve years after arrival, geographically concentrated immigrant in ows during the 1980s and 1990s could induce negative cross-state correlations between high school dropout labor force participation and DI receipt. We measure nonelderly foreign-born population using data from the 1980 and 1990 Census of Populations and the 1998 CPS. The foreign-born share of nonelderly adults rose by close to 5 percentage points during 1984 -1998, with sizable cross-state variation.
A fourth concern is growing incarceration. Because the incarcerated population is included in neither the numerator nor denominator of our labor force calculations, it is not intrinsically a source of bias. However, potential criminals have below average rates of labor force participation relative to other high school dropouts [Western, Kling, and Weiman 2001] . If states with low DI growth also experienced differential increases in incarceration over 1984 -1998, this would bias our estimates. We assemble Bureau of Justice Statistics data on state prison populations 35. We focus on an objective measure due to the evidence in Bound and Waidmann [1992, 2000] that male health self-reports closely track expansions and contractions in the supply of disability bene ts.
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(excluding local jails), denominated by state population ages 18 -64 [U. S. Department of Justice 2002] . Consistent with other authors [Freeman 1991; Katz and Krueger 1999; Pettit 2000], we nd that incarceration rates rose by a sizable 0.46 percentage point during 1984 -1998. Finally, the UI system provides an alternative (albeit shortterm) source of wage replacement for displaced workers. Declines in the value of UI bene ts during the 1980s and 1990s [Anderson and Meyer 1997] could potentially induce displaced workers to seek DI instead. We measure UI generosity as the 1984 -1999 change in the state UI replacement rates for a full-time minimum wage worker using data from the U. S. House of Representatives Green Book [various years]. Although the mean UI replacement rate did not change appreciably between 1984 and 1998, some states made substantial adjustments.
We present two sets of estimates with these variables. Table  VII shows the relationship between each measure and the annualized percentage point growth in DI rolls per nonelderly state population over 1984 -1998. Table VIII presents analogous estimates for the annualized change in high school dropout labor force participation in the same period. Because results are for the most part comparable for the two dependent variables, we discuss them in combination.
The rst three columns in each table include our two main explanatory variables: DI replacement rates (as a proxy for shifts in DI bene ts supply) and projected employment shocks. Each has a signi cant impact on DI growth and high school dropout labor force nonparticipation. When entered in combination, the projected shock measure is not precisely estimated in the labor force participation equation while the replacement rate measure remains signi cant at the 10 percent level. Since our model suggests that shocks should have larger impacts on program uptake and labor force participation where replacement rates are higher, we interact the replacement rate and shock measure in column (4). With only 50 data points, the interaction term is very imprecisely estimated.
Subsequent columns of Tables VII and VIII explore the relationship between the two outcome measures and the other candidate variables, each entered in combination with the replacement rate. Higher initial mortality (though not its change), declines in median wages of high school dropouts, and decreases in the share of foreign born, each contributed to growth in state 
